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Abstract
A secret sharing scheme is a method for distributing a secret among several parties in such a
way that only quali.ed subsets of the parties can reconstruct it and unquali.ed subsets receive
no information about the secret. A multi-secret sharing scheme is the natural extension of a
secret sharing scheme to the case in which many secrets need to be shared, each with respect
to possibly di2erent subsets of quali.ed parties. A multi-secret sharing scheme can be trivially
realized by realizing a secret sharing scheme for each of the secrets.
In this paper we address the natural questions of whether this simple construction is the most
e4cient as well, and, if not, how much improvement is possible over it, with respect to both
e4ciency measures used in the literature; namely, the maximum piece of information and the
sum of all pieces of information distributed to all parties. We completely answer these questions,
as follows. We show the .rst instance for which an improvement is possible; we prove a bound
on how much improvement is possible with respect to both measures; and we show instances
of multi-secret sharing schemes which achieve this improvement, with respect to both measures,
thus showing that the above bound is tight.
c© 2002 Published by Elsevier Science B.V.
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1. Introduction
A secret sharing scheme is a pair of e4cient algorithms: a distribution algorithm and
a reconstruction algorithm, run by a dealer and some parties. The distribution algorithm
is executed by a dealer who, given a secret, computes some shares of it and gives
them to the parties. The reconstruction algorithm is executed by a quali.ed subset of
parties who, by putting together their own shares, can therefore reconstruct the secret.
A secret sharing scheme satis.es the additional property that any non-quali.ed subset
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of participants does not obtain any information about the secret. The notion of secret
sharing was introduced by Blakley [2] and Shamir [23], who considered the important
case in which the set of quali.ed subsets of participants is the set of all subsets of
size at least k, for some integer k.
Since their introduction, secret sharing schemes have been widely employed in the
construction of more elaborated cryptographic primitives and several types of cryp-
tographic protocols. Being so often employed, central research questions in this area
are both the construction of e4cient algorithms for this task, and .nding bounds on
the possible e4ciency that such algorithms can achieve, where the e4ciency measures
mostly studied in the literature, and the ones that we will also consider in this paper,
are related to the size of the largest distributed share (typically called “information
rate”, because of its analogy with a so-called coding theory notion) or to the sum of
the length of all distributed shares (also called “average information rate”). Several
e4cient algorithms have been given in the literature (see, e.g., [1,17,23,20]) and many
lower bounds on the size of the shares distributed to participants have been presented
(see, e.g., [8,5,10,24,27]).
A natural extension of secret sharing schemes, motivated by several application sce-
narios, is to consider the case in which many secrets need to be shared, each requiring
a possibly di2erent set of quali.ed subsets of parties. These schemes are called multi-
secret sharing schemes and were considered, for instance, in [4,7,18,19].
Note that the basic scheme obtained by composing a (single) secret sharing scheme
for each of the secrets results in a multi-secret sharing scheme. However, from an
e4ciency point of view, it is interesting to ask whether this basic construction is the
best possible in general (that is, for all possible sets of quali.ed subsets of parties)
or some improvement is possible, using some di2erent construction. Moreover, it is
of interest to ask how much improvement, if any at all, can be achieved. This paper
addresses and completely answers both these questions (with respect to both e4ciency
measures considered in the literature: information rate and average information rate).
1.1. Our results
We start by de.ning two useful quantities: the maximum improvement ratio and the
average improvement ratio, measuring how the length of the maximum share and of
the sum of the shares distributed using a given multi-secret sharing scheme are shorter
than those of a scheme obtained using the above mentioned basic multi-secret sharing
scheme.
First of all, we show an example for the case of two secrets where it is possible
to construct a multi-secret sharing scheme that distributes less shares than the basic
multi-secret sharing scheme, thus showing that the latter is not always the most e4cient
approach.
Then we observe that the maximum improvement ratio is always at least 1=m, where
by m we denote the number of secrets. Namely, the maximum size of the shares of
any multi-secret sharing scheme is always at least 1=m times the maximum size of
the shares of the basic multi-secret sharing scheme. This observation directly follows
from the fact that a multi-secret sharing scheme is a (single) secret sharing scheme
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with respect to all secrets. It is also generalized to a class of e4ciency measures that
includes the average share size.
The following two constructions are our main results.
First, we show an instance of multi-secret sharing for which the average improvement
ratio is at most 1=m + , for any ¿0. Namely, there is an instance for which there
exists a multi-secret sharing scheme having average share size that is smaller than that
of the basic multi-secret sharing scheme by almost a factor of m.
Second, we show an instance of multi-secret sharing for which the max improvement
ratio is equal to 1=m. Namely, there is an instance for which there exists a multi-secret
sharing scheme having max share size smaller than that of the basic multi-secret sharing
scheme by exactly a factor of m (the best possible).
Establishing these results requires understanding the combinatorial structure that in-
stances allowing such improvements should satisfy, .nding such instances and .nding a
very e4cient multi-secret sharing scheme for them. We believe most of the techniques
used here can .nd applications in the design of e4cient multi-secret sharing schemes.
1.2. Direct product problems
An interesting observation by Moti Yung is that our investigation could also be
considered as the study of the “direct product problem” for secret sharing schemes.
A direct product problem addresses the following question. Assume we are given a
certain model of computation, a certain problem P, an instance x for problem P, and
an algorithm A that is supposed to solve the instance x for problem P; moreover, let
us associate a complexity value to algorithm A. Then the questions asks whether the
complexity of an algorithm solving k instances x1; : : : ; xk of problem P can be smaller
than the complexity of the algorithm which solves each of the instances separately. In
case the answer to this question is a4rmative, it is of interest to quantify what type of
improvement is possible, and to exhibit examples which achieve as large as possible
an improvement.
Direct product problems have received much attention in the literature, especially in
the contexts of communication complexity (see [14,16]), and computational complexity
(see [28] for boolean circuits, [21] for boolean decision trees, [22] for 2-Prover inter-
active proofs, and [13] for interactive proofs of knowledge and computational ability).
1.3. Organization of the paper and history of results
In Section 2, we present all de.nitions of interest for the rest of the paper. In
Section 3, we present our .rst instance achieving some e4ciency improvement. In
Section 4, we present our observation on the best possible improvement in the maxi-
mum and average share size when designing multi-secret sharing schemes. Our main
results are presented in Sections 5 and 6, where we present instances of multi-secret
sharing schemes for which we essentially achieve the best possible improvement in the
average and maximum share size, respectively.
Results in this paper have appeared, in some cases in less generalized form, as part of
conference proceedings publications, in [4,11,12]. Speci.cally, the results in Section 3
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have appeared in [4], those in Section 4 have appeared in [11,12], those in Section 5
have appeared in [11], and those in Section 6 in [12].
2. Denitions
In this section we recall the de.nitions of secret sharing schemes and multi-secret
sharing schemes, and de.ne quantities that will be of interest in this paper, as aver-
age and max share size, optimal average and max share size and average and max
improvement ratios.
Secret sharing schemes: Informally, a secret sharing scheme is a pair of e4cient
algorithms (the distribution and the reconstruction algorithm) which allow a dealer to
divide a certain secret s into n pieces of information, called shares, in such a way
that the following two requirements hold: quali.ed subsets of the n shares allow to
compute s (this is the correctness requirement) but given any non-quali.ed subset of
such shares, no algorithm can compute any information about s (this is the privacy
requirement). Whether a certain subset is quali.ed or not is determined by a .xed,
so-called, access structure.
More formally, let P= {P1; P2; : : : ; Pn} be a set of n participants, and de.ne an ac-
cess structure A over P as a set of subsets of P. We say that an access structure
A is monotone if A∈A implies B∈A, for any A; B such that A⊆B. Any monotone
function f over n boolean variables x1; : : : ; xn implicitly de.nes an access structure in
the standard way: if f(x1; : : : ; xn)= 1 then subset A belongs to A, where Pi ∈A if and
only if xi =1. In this paper, as usually done in secret sharing, we will only consider
monotone access structures. Then the correctness requirement is formalized by saying
that, for any subset A∈A, given the shares returned by the distribution algorithm and
corresponding to parties in A, the reconstruction algorithm returns a value equal to the
secret. Moreover, the privacy requirement is formalized by saying that, for any subset
A =∈A, the value of the secret is independent from the value of the shares returned by
the distribution algorithm and corresponding to parties in A.
Max and average share size: We denote by rS the random variable denoting the
secret and taking value s∈ S and by rSH1; : : : ; rSHn the random variables denoting the
shares, each taking value shi ∈ Shi (all variables being determined by the distribution
from which the secret s is selected and by an execution of the distribution algorithm
D on input s). We de.ne the max share size for access structure A with respect to
secret sharing scheme (D;R) as the value
MaxShSize(A; (D;R)) =
n
max
i=1
H(rSHi)
and the average share size for access structure A with respect to secret sharing scheme
(D;R) as the value
AvShSize(A; (D;R)) =
n∑
i=1
H(rSHi);
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where by H we denote the binary entropy function (see, e.g. [9]). We then de.ne the
optimal max share size for access structure A as the value
OpMaxShSize(A) = min
(D;R)
MaxShSize(A; (D;R))
and the optimal average share size for access structure A as the value
OpAvShSize(A) = min
(D;R)
AvShSize(A; (D;R)):
We note that the quantity usually called “information rate” (resp., “average information
rate”) in the literature is de.ned as the ratio of the entropy of the secret to the max
(resp., average) share size.
2.1. Multi-secret sharing schemes
Informally, a multi-secret sharing scheme is a pair of e4cient algorithms (the dis-
tribution and the reconstruction algorithm) which allow a dealer to divide m secrets
s1; : : : ; sm into n shares in such a way that the following two requirements hold for
each i=1; : : : ; m: quali.ed subsets of the n shares allow to compute si (this is the
correctness requirement), but given any non-quali.ed subset of such shares, no algo-
rithm can compute any information about si other than the information that is given
by the secrets determined by such shares; moreover, this holds even if the value of
all other secrets is known (this is the privacy requirement). For each i=1; : : : ; m,
whether a certain subset is quali.ed or not for the computation of the ith secret si
is determined by a .xed access structure Ai. An important observation is that the
m access structures, each associated with secret si, for i=1; : : : ; m, are not, in gen-
eral, equal. More formally, the correctness requirement is de.ned by saying that for
any i=1; : : : ; m, and for any subset A∈Ai, given the shares returned by the distri-
bution algorithm and corresponding to parties in A and value i, the reconstruction
algorithm returns a value equal to secret si. Moreover, the privacy requirement is for-
malized by saying that, for any i=1; : : : ; m, and for any subset A =∈Ai, the value of
the ith secret si is independent from the value of the shares returned by the distri-
bution algorithm and corresponding to parties in A, even given the value of all other
secrets.
Max and average share size: In the rest of the paper we will assume, for sim-
plicity, that all secrets have the same size, i.e., |s1|= · · · = |sm|= l, for some positive
integer l. Similarly as for the case of single-secret sharing, we will denote by rSm
the random variable denoting the m-tuple of secrets and taking value s1; : : : ; sm ∈ Sm
and by rSH1; : : : ; rSHn the random variables denoting the shares returned by the dis-
tribution algorithm, each taking value shi ∈ SHi. We de.ne the max share size of
access structures A1; : : : ;Am with respect to multi-secret sharing scheme (D;R) as the
value
MaxShSize(A1; : : : ;Am; (D;R)) =
n
max
i=1
H(rSHi);
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and the average share size of access structures A1; : : : ;Am with respect to multi-secret
sharing scheme (D;R) as the value
AvShSize(A1; : : : ;Am; (D;R)) =
n∑
i=1
H(rSHi):
We then de.ne the optimal max share size of access structures A1; : : : ;Am as the value
OpMaxShSize(A1; : : : ;Am)= min
(D;R)
MaxShSize(A1; : : : ;Am; (D;R))
and the optimal average share size of access structures A1; : : : ;Am as the value
OpAvShSize(A1; : : : ;Am) = min
(D;R)
AvShSize(A1; : : : ;Am; (D;R)):
2.2. Improvement ratios
We de.ne some new quantities that will help for our investigations in the rest of
the paper.
The basic multi-secret sharing scheme: The .rst approach to consider in constructing
a multi-secret sharing scheme for access structures A1; : : : ;Am is certainly to combine m
(single-secret) sharing schemes, each for access structure Ai, for i=1; : : : ; m. Specif-
ically, given secret sharing scheme (Di ;Ri) for access structure Ai, for i=1; : : : ; m,
de.ne the ((D1;R1); : : : ; (Dm;Rm))-composed scheme as the following multi-secret shar-
ing scheme (c-D; c-R): algorithm c-D sequentially runs algorithms D1; : : : ;Dm, using
each time independently chosen random bits; algorithm c-R takes as additional input
an index i (meaning that it is trying to recover the ith secret) and runs algorithm Ri
using as additional input the output of Di. We can now de.ne the max basic multi-
secret sharing scheme for access structures A1; : : : ;Am, that we denote as (b-D; b-R),
as the ((D1;R1); : : : ; (Dm;Rm))-composed scheme, for the same structures, such that, for
i=1; : : : ; m, each (Di ;Ri) is chosen so that it minimizes OpMaxShSize(Ai); moreover,
if for some i there are many schemes (Di ;Ri) which minimize OpMaxShSize(Ai), we
choose the one that results in the minimum value for MaxShSize(A1; : : : ;Am; (c-D; c-R)).
We can similarly de.ne the average basic multi-secret sharing scheme for access
structures A1; : : : ;Am, by replacing in the above de.nition the terms
OpMaxShSize;MaxShSize with the terms OpAvShSize;AvShSize,
respectively.
Improvement ratios: In order to study all other possible approaches for construct-
ing a multi-secret sharing scheme, we de.ne quantities that measure how well these
approaches perform, when compared with the basic multi-secret sharing scheme for
the same access structures. Speci.cally, we de.ne the max-improvement ratio for ac-
cess structures A1; : : : ;Am with respect to multi-secret sharing scheme (D;R) as the
value
MaxIR(A1; : : : ;Am; (D;R)) =
MaxShSize(A1; : : : ;Am; (D;R))
MaxShSize(A1; : : : ;Am; (b-D; b-R))
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and the average-improvement ratio for access structures A1; : : : ;Am with respect to
multi-secret sharing scheme (D;R) as the value
AvIR(A1; : : : ;Am; (D;R)) =
AvShSize(A1; : : : ;Am; (D;R))
AvShSize(A1; : : : ;Am; (b-D; b-R))
:
We also de.ne the optimal max-improvement ratio for access structures A1; : : : ;Am
as the value
OpMaxIR(A1; : : : ;Am) = min
(D;R)
MaxIR(A1; : : : ;Am; (D;R))
and the optimal average-improvement ratio for access structures A1; : : : ;Am as the
value
OpAvIR(A1; : : : ;Am) = min
(D;R)
AvIR(A1; : : : ;Am; (D;R)):
Remark. We note that it is easy to come up with elementary tuples of access struc-
tures for which the improvement ratio is equal to 1; namely, for which no e4ciency
improvement is possible (for instance, just think of each access structure being de.ned
over a new group of parties, or all access structure being equal). Moreover, results
in [4] imply that no improvement is possible for a large class of interesting access
structures (namely, the so-called threshold structures).
3. An instance achieving some improvement on the average
In this section, we present the .rst instance (and the simplest we could .nd) that
allows to achieve some improvement over the basic multi-secret sharing scheme, thus
positively answering the question of whether there exists an approach for constructing
multi-secret sharing scheme that is more e4cient than the basic multi-secret sharing
scheme. Speci.cally, we show a pair of access structures and a multi-secret sharing
scheme for it that achieves average improvement ratio equal to 5=6.
The access structures: Let P= {P; P1; P2} be a set of three participants, and let m=2.
We de.ne two access structures as Ai = {{P; Pi}; {P1; P2}}, for i=1; 2.
The basic multi-secret sharing scheme for A1;A2: For i=1; 2, a single-secret sharing
scheme (Di ;Ri) for access structure Ai is obtained as follows. On input a secret s,
algorithm Di uniformly and independently chooses a string ai of the same length as
s and distributes ai to participants P; P3−i, and string a⊕ s to participant Pi1. The
algorithm Ri is straightforward: for instance P and Pi can compute the logical xor of
ai ⊕ s and s and therefore recover s. Since such scheme is optimal in terms of average
share size, the basic multi-secret sharing scheme (b-D; b-R) for A1;A2 is then obtained
by just composing the schemes (Di,Ri) according to the de.nition of basic multi-secret
sharing scheme. Notice that the share size AvShSize(A1;A2; (b-D; b-R)) of the scheme
(b-D; b-R) is 6H(rS).
1In this scheme and in the rest of the paper we use the bitwise xoring operation (denoted as ⊕) over
.elds GF(2n), for some integer n; however, these settings are not essential for the schemes to work.
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An e8cient multi-secret sharing scheme for A1;A2: We now show a scheme (D;R)
that achieves AvShSize(A1;A2; (D;R))= 5H(rS). On input secrets s1; s2, algorithm D
uniformly and independently chooses a; b∈{0; 1}|s1| and distributes share a⊕ b to P,
shares a⊕ s1; b to P1 and shares a; b⊕ s2 to P2. Simple xoring operations allow algo-
rithm R to recover secret s.
4. A lower bound on the optimal improvement ratios
In this section, we present a lower bound on the optimal max and average improve-
ment ratio for any tuple of access structures. Informally, this result gives a limit on the
possibility of designing non-trivial algorithms for multi-secret sharing schemes versus
the trivial approach of the above de.ned basic multi-secret sharing scheme. The limit
consists of the fact that the largest share of any multi-secret sharing scheme can be
smaller than the largest share of the basic multi-secret sharing scheme for the same
access structures by a factor of at most the number of secrets. The same limit holds
for the sum of the shares. Formally, we have the following
Theorem 1. Let m; n be positive integers and let A1; : : : ;Am be access structures over
a set of size n. It holds that
1. OpMaxIR(A1; : : : ;Am)¿1=m:
2. OpAvIR(A1; : : : ;Am)¿1=m:
The rest of this section is devoted to the proof of Theorem 1. We actually state a
generalized version of the theorem, holding with respect to a class of e4ciency mea-
sures, including max share size and average share size. We start with some de.nitions.
Some de:nitions: Let  denote a measure function which, on input one or many
access structures and a (multi- or single-) secret sharing scheme, returns a real number.
We de.ne the -complexity of access structure A and secret sharing scheme (D;R)
as the value (A; (D;R)). The optimal -complexity of access structure A is the value
∗(A) = min
(D;R)
(A; (D;R)):
We also de.ne the -complexity of access structures A1; : : : ;Am and multi-secret shar-
ing scheme (D;R) as the value (A1; : : : ;Am; (D;R)), and the optimal -complexity of
access structures A1; : : : ;Am as the value
∗(A1; : : : ;Am) = min
(D;R)
(A1; : : : ;Am; (D;R)):
We say that a measure function is sub-additive if for any positive integers m; n, for
any access structures A1; : : : ;Am over a set of size n, and for any secret sharing scheme
(Di ;Ri) for access structure Ai, where i=1; : : : ; m, it holds that
(A1; : : : ;Am; (c-D; c-R))6
m∑
i=1
(Ai ; (Di ;Ri));
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where by (c-D; c-R) we denote the ((D1;R1); : : : ; (Dm;Rm))-composed scheme. We note
that the class of sub-additive measure functions include the two measure functions
typically used in the literature, namely the max share size and the average share size.
Proof of Theorem 1. Given the above de.nitions, we can state a generalized version
of Theorem 1 as the following:
Lemma 2. Let m; n be positive integers and let A1; : : : ;Am be access structures over
a set of size n. For any sub-additive measure function , it holds that
-OpIR(A1; : : : ;Am)¿ 1=m:
We note that the theorem follows from the above lemma and the observation that
both the max share size and the average share size are sub-additive measures. In the
sequel we prove Lemma 2. We start the proof with two facts. The .rst fact relates
the optimal complexity for a sequence of access structures to the optimal complexity
of each access structure.
Fact 3. Let m; n be positive integers, let A1; : : : ;Am be access structures over a set of
size n, and let  be a measure function. It holds that
∗(A1; : : : ;Am)¿
1
m
m∑
i=1
∗(Ai):
Proof. By de.nition of ∗ it holds that ∗(A1; : : : ;Am)= min(D;R) (A1; : : : ;Am; (D;R)).
Let (D0;R0) be the multi-secret sharing scheme for which the quantity ∗(A1; : : : ;Am) is
minimized. Note that (D0;R0) is also a (single-) secret sharing scheme for access struc-
ture Ai, for each i=1; : : : ; m, which implies that ∗(A1; : : : ;Am)= (Ai ; (D0;R0)). By
de.nition of ∗, we obtain that (Ai ; (D0;R0))¿∗(Ai), and therefore ∗(A1; : : : ;Am)¿
∗(Ai), for each i=1; : : : ; m. Finally, the claimed inequality is obtained by summing
the latter inequality for all i=1; : : : ; m, and dividing both sides by m.
The second fact relates the complexity of m access structures with respect to the
basic multi-secret sharing schemes to the optimal complexity of such access structures.
Fact 4. Let m; n be positive integers, let A1; : : : ;Am be access structures over a set
of size n, let  be a sub-additive measure function, and let (b-D; b-R) be the -basic
multi-secret sharing scheme for A1; : : : ;Am. It holds that
(A1; : : : ;Am; (b-D; b-D))6
m∑
i=1
∗(Ai):
Proof. Let (D1;R1); : : : ; (Dm;Rm) be the m single-secret sharing schemes which are used
in the basic multi-secret sharing scheme (b-D; b-R). Observe that the assumption that 
is sub-additive implies that (A1; : : : ;Am; (b-D; b-R))6
∑m
i=1 (Ai ; (Di ;Ri)): Moreover,
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by de.nition of (b-D; b-R), it holds that each scheme (Di,Ri) satis.es (Ai ; (Di ;Ri))= ∗
(Ai), for i=1; : : : ; m, from which the claimed inequality follows.
Concluding the proof. Given the above two facts, we can .nally rewrite -OpIR(A1; : : : ;
Am) as
-OpIR(A1; : : : ;Am) =
min(D;R){(A1; : : : ;Am; (D;R))}
(A1; : : : ;Am; (b-D; b-R))
=
∗(A1; : : : ;Am)
(A1; : : : ;Am; (b-D; b-R))
¿
(1=m) ·∑mi=1 ∗(Ai)
(A1; : : : ;Am; (b-D; b-R))
¿
1
m
;
where the .rst equality follows from the de.nition of improvement ratio, the second
equality from the de.nition of optimal complexity, the .rst inequality from Fact 3 and
the second inequality from Fact 4. This concludes the proof of Lemma 2.
5. An upper bound on the average improvement ratio
In this section, we present an upper bound on the optimal average improvement ratio.
Our bound is obtained by exhibiting a speci.c tuple of access structures and a multi-
secret sharing schemes for it. Moreover, the improvement in e4ciency is essentially
the best possible; in other words, the sum of the shares distributed according to our
multi-secret sharing scheme is smaller than the sum of the shares distributed according
to the basic multi-secret sharing scheme by a factor which is at most 1=m+ , for any
¿0, where m is the number of secrets. Formally, we obtain the following
Theorem 5. Let m be an integer. For any ¿0, there exist access structures A1; : : : ;Am
such that
OpAvIR(A1; : : : ;Am)6 1=m+ :
Remark. Intuitively, this result guarantees the possibility of designing non-trivial multi-
secret sharing schemes which have much better average share size than using the basic
multi-secret sharing scheme. The fact that, as we will see later, the access structures
used to prove the theorem are graph-based (a relatively elementary class of access
structures) should be viewed as evidence that the class of access structures for which
the average improvement ratio is strictly smaller than 1 is indeed quite large. Most
importantly, our construction essentially matches the bound of Theorem 1, and, there-
fore, it shows that such bound exactly quanti.es the possible improvement (in terms
of average share size) in the design of a multi-secret sharing scheme.
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Strategy towards proving the theorem. Finding a tuple of access structure and a
scheme for it that is better than the basic multi-secret sharing scheme requires the
following steps. First, a tuple of access structures needs to be carefully selected, in
such a way that the following two steps can be successfully performed. Second, a
single-secret sharing scheme with optimal share size needs to be presented for each of
these access structures, so that a basic multi-secret sharing scheme can be constructed.
(Here note that the number of access structures that are known in the literature to
have optimal constructions for single-secret sharing is very small.) Third, an e4cient
multi-secret sharing scheme needs to be presented for the access structures, so that the
max share size of this scheme is smaller than that of the basic multi-secret sharing
scheme.
The access structures: Let ¿0 be a constant, let m be a positive integer and let
n= ((1−)m−1)=
. We de.ne the set P of participants as P= {X1; : : : ; Xm; Y1; : : : ; Yn}.
For i=1; : : : ; m, de.ne access structure Ai as the set of subsets Z ⊆ P such that (1)
Xi ∈Z and Yj ∈Z , for j=1; : : : ; n, and (2) Xi ∈Z and Xj ∈Z , for j=1; : : : ; i − 1; i +
1; : : : ; n.
The basic multi-secret sharing scheme for A1; : : : ;Am: For i=1; : : : ; m, a single-secret
sharing scheme (Di,Ri) for access structure Ai is obtained as follows. On input a secret
s, algorithm Di uniformly chooses a string ai of the same length as s and distributes ai
to participants X1; : : : ; Xi−1; Xi+1; : : : ; Xm, Y1; : : : ; Yn and strings ai ⊕ s to participant Xi.
The algorithm Ri is straightforward: for instance Y1 and Xi can compute the logical
xor of ai ⊕ s and s and therefore recover s; participants Xi and Xj, j = i, can compute
s in the same way. Since this scheme has optimal average share size, the basic multi-
secret sharing scheme (b-D; b-R) for A1; : : : ;Am is then obtained by just composing
the schemes (Di,Ri) according to the de.nition of basic multi-secret sharing scheme.
Notice that the share size AvShSize(A1; : : : ; Am; (b-D; b-R)) of the scheme (b-D; b-R) is
m(m+ n)H(rS).
An e8cient multi-secret sharing scheme for A1; : : : ;Am: We now describe a more
e4cient multi-secret sharing scheme (D;R) for the above access structures A1; : : : ;Am.
The algorithm D is as follows. On input secrets s1; : : : ; sm of the same size, say, l, it uni-
formly and independently chooses l-bit strings a1; : : : ; am and gives string a1⊕ · · · ⊕ am
to participants Y1; : : : ; Yn and strings a1; : : : ; ai−1; ai+1; : : : ; am; ai ⊕ si to participant Xi, for
i=1; : : : ; m. The algorithm R is straightforward: for instance, on input i, participants
Xi and Yj can easily xor all strings a1; : : : ; ai−1; ai+1; : : : ; am; ai ⊕ si and a1⊕ · · · ⊕ am
to compute si; participants Xi and Xj, j = i, can compute si by xoring ai and ai ⊕ si.
Properties of our scheme: In order to prove the correctness property of the above
scheme (D;R) we need to show that for each i=1; : : : ; m, each subset A∈Ai is able
to compute si with probability 1. Let us consider a generic i∈{1; : : : ; m}; then from
the description of algorithm R it is clear that all pairs of participants Xi and Yj, where
j=1; : : : ; n, can compute si, and similarly can all pairs of participants Xi and Xj,
where j=1; : : : ; i− 1; i+1; : : : ; m. Finally, the correctness follows by observing that all
remaining subsets of participants in Ai contain one of these two pairs of participants.
In order to prove the privacy property of the above scheme (D;R) we need to show
that for each i=1; : : : ; m, each subset A =∈Ai receives no information about si other
than that given by the value of all the secrets that it can reconstruct; moreover, this
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has to hold even given the value of all remaining secrets. Consider a generic secret
si and the subset A of P containing participants Y1; : : : ; Yn; X1; : : : ; Xi−1; Xi+1; : : : ; Xm; we
observe that the value of the shares of the participants in A is independent from the
value of secret si. This implies that the claim is true for subset A. Similarly, the claim
is true for the subset containing the only participant Xi since his shares are independent
from si. Then we observe that the claim holds for all other subsets of participants not
in Ai since they are all contained in subset A.
Improvement ratio of our scheme: We note that the scheme (D;R) has share size
equal to
AvShSize(A1; : : : ;Am; (D;R))= (m2+n) ·H(rS), while scheme (b-D; b-R) has share size
equal to
AvShSize(A1; : : : ;Am; (b-D; b-R))= (m(n+ m)) ·H(rS). We then have that
AvIR(A1; : : : ;Am; (D;R)) =
AvShSize(A1; : : : ;Am; (D;R))
AvShSize(A1; : : : ;Am; (b− D; b− R))
=
m2 + n
m2 + mn
6
1
m
+ ;
where the last inequality follows from the choice of n. Therefore, we have that
OpAvIR(A1; : : : ;Am)6
1
m
+ :
This concludes the proof of Theorem 5.
6. An upper bound on the max-improvement ratio
In this section we present an upper bound on the optimal max improvement ratio.
Our bound is obtained by exhibiting a speci.c tuple of access structures and a multi-
secret sharing schemes for it. This construction gives the .rst example of a multi-secret
sharing scheme that is more e4cient than the basic multi-secret sharing scheme for
the same access structures, in terms of max share size. Moreover, the improvement
in e4ciency is exactly the best possible; in other words, the largest share distributed
according to our multi-secret sharing scheme is smaller than the largest share distributed
according to the basic multi-secret sharing scheme by a factor exactly equal to m, the
number of secrets. Formally, we obtain the following
Theorem 6. Let m be an integer. There exists an integer n and access structures
A1; : : : ;Am over a set of size n such that OpMaxIR(A1; : : : ;Am)= 1=m:
Remark. Intuitively, this result guarantees the possibility of designing non-trivial multi-
secret sharing schemes which have much better max share size than using the basic
multi-secret sharing scheme. In the proof of this theorem we use a combination of
graph-based access structures and the size of subsets in the access structures in the
theorem is at most 3. This should be viewed as evidence that the class of access
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structures for which the max improvement ratio is strictly smaller than 1 is indeed quite
large. Most importantly, our construction exactly matches the bound of Theorem 1,
and, therefore, it shows that such bound exactly quanti.es the possible improvement
(in terms of max share size) in the design of a multi-secret sharing scheme.
Subtleties towards proving the theorem: The overall strategy used to prove the
theorem goes along similar lines as for Theorem 5; namely we again need to .nd
a tuple of access structure and a scheme for it that is “better” than the basic multi-
secret sharing scheme. The key di2erence, however, is that the improvement has to be
in terms of the max share size. We note that all constructions of multi-secret sharing
schemes in the literature and even our construction presented in the previous section do
not give any improvement in terms of max share size (the construction of Section 5
improves only with respect to the average share size). Therefore, our construction
requires completely new ideas.
Informal description of the proof: The rest of this section is devoted to the proof of
the above theorem. We start by presenting an m-tuple of access structure and a multi-
secret sharing scheme for it based on a recursive approach. This scheme achieves max
improvement ratio equal to (1+log m)=m. Although this construction already gives a
signi.cant improvement over the basic multi-secret sharing scheme, it is still far from
the optimal by a logarithmic factor. In order to gain such factor, we take a single graph
access structure which has quite large max share size (such constructions exist in the
literature) and carefully compose it with the m-tuple of access structure constructed
so far. Speci.cally, we purposely increase the max share size of each single access
structure by a logarithmic (in m) factor. As a result, the basic multi-secret sharing
scheme achieves a max share size of m log m + m. Finally, because of the careful
insertion of the latter graph access structure in the previously constructed m-tuple,
we can use the previously constructed multi-secret sharing scheme and achieve max
improvement ratio equal to (1 + log m)=m(1 + log m)= 1=m.
6.1. A :rst m-tuple of access structures
We present a tuple of access structures, we analyze the performance of the basic
multi-secret sharing scheme and present an improved multi-secret sharing scheme for
it. These structures achieve a max improvement ratio equal to (1+ log m)=m, where
m is the number of secrets. The ideas used in this construction consist of relating
shares distributed to participants by combinatorial equalities de.ned according to some
butterNy-type network, and then employing some tricks used in single-secret sharing
schemes.
The access structures: Let m be a positive integer, let n=m+1, and de.ne the set
P of participants as P= {X1; : : : ; Xm; Y}. For i=1; : : : ; m, de.ne access structure Ai as
the set of subsets Z of P such that Xi ∈Z and U ∈Z , for any U ∈ P\{Xi}.
The basic multi-secret sharing scheme for A1; : : : ;Am: For i=1; : : : ; m, a single-secret
sharing scheme (Di ;Ri) for access structure Ai is obtained as follows. On input a secret
s, algorithm Di uniformly chooses a string ai of the same length as s and distributes
string ai to participants X1; : : : ; Xi−1; Xi+1; : : : ; Xm; Y , and string ai ⊕ s to participant Xi.
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The algorithm Ri is straightforward: .rst note that Y and Xi can compute the logical xor
of ai ⊕ s and s and therefore recover s; then note that participants Xi and Xj, for any
j∈{1; : : : ; n}\{i}, can compute s in the same way. Note that this scheme is optimal
with respect to the max share size measure since each party obtains a share of the
same size of the secret, which is the minimum necessary, as proved in several papers.
Moreover, any other scheme optimal for Ai distributes the same amount of information
to all parties. Therefore, the basic multi-secret sharing scheme (b-D; b-R) for A1; : : : ;Am
is obtained by composing the above de.ned schemes (Di ;Ri) according to the de.nition
of basic multi-secret sharing scheme. We observe that the optimal max share size
MaxShSize(Ai ; (Di ;Ri)) of the above scheme (Di ;Ri) is equal to H(rS), and therefore
the max share size MaxShSize(A1; : : : ;Am; (b-D; b-R)) of the scheme (b-D; b-R) is equal
to m ·H(rS).
An e8cient multi-secret sharing scheme for A1; : : : ;Am: We now describe a more
e4cient multi-secret sharing scheme (D;R) for the above access structures A1; : : : ;Am.
Instructions for algorithm D: On input a k-bit secret s, do the following:
1. Uniformly and independently choose k-bit strings a1; : : : ; am.
2. Give a1⊕ · · · ⊕ am to Y.
3. Give ai ⊕ si to Xi, for i=1; : : : ; m.
4. Run procedure ProcD(1; m; aa), where aa=(a1; : : : ; am).
Instructions for Procedure ProcD: On input min; max; aa, do the following:
1. Let med= (min+ max + 1)=2.
2. Let S0 = {min; : : : ; med− 1} and S1 = {med; : : : ; max}.
3. Give ⊕i∈S0 ai to Xj, for all j∈ S1.
4. Give ⊕i∈S1 ai to Xj, for all j∈ S0.
5. Run procedures ProcD(min; med− 1; aa) and ProcD(med;max; aa).
6. Return.
Instructions for algorithm R: On input i∈{1; : : : ; m}, and A∈Ai, do the following
1. If A= {Y; Xi} then
let t be the share given to Y ;
let t1; : : : ; tl be the shares given to Xi;
output: si = t1⊕ · · · ⊕ tl⊕ t.
2. If A= {Xi; Xj} then run procedure ProcR(1; m; aa).
Instructions for Procedure ProcR: On input min; max; aa, do the following:
1. Let med= (min+ max + 1)=2.
2. Let S0 = {min; : : : ; med− 1} and S1 = {med; : : : ; max}.
3. If Xi; Xj ∈ S0 then run procedure ProcR(min; med− 1; aa) and return.
4. If Xi; Xj ∈ S1 then run procedure ProcR(med;max; aa) and return.
5. If Xi ∈ S0 and Xj ∈ S1 then
let t be the share given to Xj equal to amin⊕ · · · ⊕ amed−1;
let t1; : : : ; tl be the shares given to Xi using any of the values amin; : : : ; amed−1
in their computation;
output: si = t1⊕ · · · ⊕ tl⊕ t and return.
6. If Xj ∈ S0 and Xi ∈ S1 then
let t be the share given to Xj equal to amed⊕ · · · ⊕ amax;
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let t1; : : : ; tl be the shares given to Xi using any of the values amed; : : : ; amax; in
their computation;
output: si = t1⊕ · · · ⊕ tl⊕ t and return.
We describe an example for how the above construction works for the case m=8.
Recall that the set of participants is P= {X1; : : : ; X8; Y}; for i=1; : : : ; 8, access structure
Ai includes all subsets of P that include the subsets {Xj; Xi}, for all j∈{1; : : : ; 8}\{i},
and subset {Y; Xi}. Now, consider scheme (D;R); let us call s1; : : : ; s8 the 8 secrets,
and a1; : : : ; a8 the random values chosen during the execution of algorithm D; then the
shares distributed to the participants are of the following form:
• a1⊕ · · · ⊕ a8 to participant Y ;
• a5⊕ a6⊕ a7⊕ a8; a3⊕ a4; a2; a1⊕ s1 to participant X1;
• a5⊕ a6⊕ a7⊕ a8; a3⊕ a4; a1; a2⊕ s2 to participant X2;
• a5⊕ a6⊕ a7⊕ a8; a1⊕ a2; a4; a3⊕ s3 to participant X3;
• a5⊕ a6⊕ a7⊕ a8; a1⊕ a2; a3; a4⊕ s4 to participant X4;
• a1⊕ a2⊕ a3⊕ a4; a7⊕ a8; a6; a5⊕ s5 to participant X5;
• a1⊕ a2⊕ a3⊕ a4; a7⊕ a8; a5; a6⊕ s6 to participant X6;
• a1⊕ a2⊕ a3⊕ a4; a5⊕ a6; a8; a7⊕ s7 to participant X7;
• a1⊕ a2⊕ a3⊕ a4; a5⊕ a6; a7; a8⊕ s8 to participant X8.
We note that the max share size MaxShSize(A1; : : : ;Am; (D;R)) of scheme (D;R) is
equal to (1 + log m) ·H(rS) (since all parties Xi receive 1 + log m shares of the
same size as the secret, which is assumed wlog to be equal to its entropy). Instead,
scheme (b-D; b-R) has max share size MaxShSize(A1; : : : ;Am; (b-D; b-R))=m ·H(rS).
We then have that MaxIR(A1; : : : ;Am; (D;R)) is equal to
MaxShSize(A1; : : : ;Am; (D;R))
MaxShSize(A1; : : : ;Am; (b-D; b-R))
=
(1 + log m) ·H(rS)
m ·H(rS) =
1 + log m
m
:
6.2. A speci:c graph-based access structure
In this section, we combine some results in the literature to obtain an access structure
with certain speci.c properties. Oddly enough, a .rst property we require from such
access structure is that the optimal max share size of it has to be much larger than the
size of the secret; speci.cally, we would like the ratio of the size of the secret to the
optimal max share size to go to 0 as the number of secrets grows. A second property
we require is that there exists a construction of a secret sharing scheme that exactly
achieves the optimal max share size. One construction in the literature that satis.es
the above two property is presented in [3], based on an access structure presented in
[27]. We now recall some necessary de.nitions and results. First of all, we say that an
access structure A is graph-based if for each subset A∈A, there exists a subset B such
that B∈A, B⊆A, and |B|=2. A graph-based access structure A can be described by
a graph GA, which is called the graph associated to A, and is de.ned as follows: the
set of vertices is the set of participants, and the set of edges is de.ned by all subsets
B in A such that |B|=2.
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Fact 7 (Blundo et al. [3], van Dijk [27]). For any even positive integer q; p¿6, and
any positive integer d¿2, there exists a graph-based access structure A such that the
graph associated to A is d-regular and has qpd−2 nodes, and such that the optimal
max share size of A is greater or equal to (d+ 1)H(rS)=2.
Fact 8 (Stinson [25]). For any positive integer d, and any graph-based access struc-
ture A, such that the graph associated to A has max degree d, it is possible to
construct a secret sharing scheme (D;R) for A such that the max share size of A
with respect to (D;R) is equal to (d+ 1)H(rS)=2.
By combining the above two facts, we obtain the following
Fact 9 (Stinson [25], Blundo et al. [3], van Dijk [27]). For any even positive integer
q; p¿6, and any positive integer d¿2, there exists a graph-based access structure
A, such that the graph associated to A has max degree d and qpd−2 nodes, and such
that (a) the optimal max share size of A is greater or equal to (d+ 1)H(rS)=2, and
(b) it is possible to construct a secret sharing scheme (D;R) for A such that the max
share size of A with respect to (D;R) is equal to (d+ 1)H(rS)=2.
6.3. A substitution-based construction
We now conclude the description of our construction by describing a .nal step.
Informally, we would like to replace the participant Y in the access structures A1; : : : ;Am
with any quali.ed subset of the access structure A from Fact 9.
The access structures: Let m be a positive integer, which we assume for simplicity
to be equal to 2l, for some positive integer l; let q=p=6, d=2(1 + log m) − 1,
k = qpd−2 and n=m+k. De.ne the set P of participants as P= {X1; : : : ; Xm; U1; : : : ; Uk}.
Let A be the access structure over {U1; : : : ; Uk} guaranteed by Fact 9. For i=1; : : : ; m,
de.ne access structure Ai as the set of subsets Z of P such that either: (a) Xi ∈Z and
Xj ∈Z , for any j = i, or (b) Xi ∈Z and ∃Y ⊆{U1; : : : ; Uk} such that Y ⊆Z and Y ∈A.
The max-basic multi-secret sharing scheme for A1; : : : ;Am: A crucial fact to observe
is that any secret sharing scheme for access structure Ai has max share size at least
(1 + log m) ·H(rS). Assume for the sake of contradiction that this is not the case;
then, observe that 1 + log m=(d+ 1)=2, and therefore there exists a secret sharing
scheme for Ai that has max share size smaller than (d+ 1)H(rS)=2. This scheme can
be used, for instance as done in the proof of Lemma 4.1 in [6], in order to construct
a secret sharing scheme for access structure A having max share size smaller than
(d + 1)H(rS)=2. This contradicts Fact 9. Finally, we derive that the max-basic multi-
secret sharing scheme for A1; : : : ;Am has max share size at least m(1+log m) ·H(rS)
(in fact, this inequality can be made tight by using Fact 9).
An e8cient multi-secret sharing scheme for A1; : : : ;Am: A multi-secret sharing
scheme (D;R) for A1; : : : ;Am can then simply be obtained from the multi-secret sharing
scheme given in Section 6.1, call it (D0;R0), and the single-secret sharing scheme for
access structure A guaranteed by Fact 9, call it (D1;R1), as follows. Algorithm D runs
algorithm D0 with the following modi.cation: when algorithm D0 sends a1⊕ · · · ⊕ am
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to Y , algorithm D shares a1⊕ · · · ⊕ am among the participants U1; : : : ; Uk , and accord-
ing to algorithm D1. Algorithm R runs algorithm R0 with the following modi.cation:
when algorithm R0 require participant Y to provide the share equal to a1⊕ · · · ⊕ am,
algorithm R requires participants U1; : : : ; Uk to run algorithm R1 to recover the value
a1⊕ · · · ⊕ am and to provide such value for the remaining computation made by R.
Properties and max improvement ratio of our scheme: The correctness property of
our scheme (D;R) follows directly from the analogue property of schemes (D0;R0)
and (D1;R1). The privacy property of (D;R) follows the same reasoning done in order
to prove the analogue property of scheme (D0;R0) after replacing participant Y with
the participants U1; : : : ; Uk . We note that in our scheme (D;R) all parties Xi receive
1+log m shares of the same size as the secret, as can be seen by the construction of
algorithm D0, and all parties Ui also receive 1+log m shares of the same size as the
secret, because of Fact 9. Therefore the max share size MaxShSize(A1; : : : ;Am; (D;R))
of scheme (D;R) is equal to (1 + log m)H(rS). Instead, scheme (b-D; b-R) has max
share size MaxShSize(A1; : : : ;Am; (b-D; b-R))=m(1 + log m) ·H(rS). We conclude
the proof of Theorem 6 by observing that MaxIR(A1; : : : ;Am; (D;R)) is equal to
MaxShSize(A1; : : : ;Am; (D;R))
MaxShSize(A1; : : : ;Am; (b-D; b-R))
=
(1 + log m)H(rS)
m(1 + log m)H(rS) =
1
m
:
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